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WEAK & STRONG FINANCIAL FRAGILITY
J.L. GELUK, L. DE HAAN, AND C. G. DE VRIES
Abstract. The stability of the financial system at higher loss levels is ei-
ther characterized by asymptotic dependence or asymptotic independence. If
asymptotically independent, the dependency, when present, eventually dies out
completely at the more extreme quantiles, as in case of the multivariate normal
distribution. Given that financial service firms’ equity returns depend linearly
on the risk drivers, we show that the marginals’ distributions maximum do-
main of attraction determines the type of systemic (in-)stability. A scale for
the amount of dependency at high loss levels is designed. This permits a char-
acterization of systemic risk inherent to different financial network structures.
The theory also suggests the functional form of the economically relevant limit
copulas.
1. Introduction
The financial system is inherently fragile due to its exposure to common and
mutual risks and in particular due to the duration mismatch of the assets and
liabilities of the banking sector. Financial crises are a recurrent phenomenon with
important effects on the real economy. It is therefore of great importance to be
able to understand, measure and characterize the systemic stability of the finan-
cial service sector. The theoretical literature on systemic stability, using micro
information asymmetry and macro risks, provides insightful explanations for the
fragility.1 Some research has tried to measure the amount of fragility potentially
present, but a coherent framework within which the fragility of a system can be
evaluated is more or less absent from the literature. In this paper we use statis-
tical multivariate extreme value theory to provide such a framework, linking the
financial stability theories and the empirical work. This theory implies that the
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Key words and phrases. Systemic Stability, Multivariate Extreme Value Analysis, Asymptotic
(In-)dependence
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1Empirically, the macro risk drivers appear to be the dominant source behind financial crises.
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interdependency at crisis levels is one of two types. We show that the financial
service institutions (FSI) are either asymptotically independent (weakly fragile)
albeit possibly being correlated, or the FSI are asymptotically dependent (strongly
fragile). If asymptotically independent, the dependency when present, eventually
dies out completely at the extreme quantiles. Per contrast, under strong fragility
the dependency remains, even in the limit. Thus the systemic risk can be quite
different depending on the type of fragility.
Consider the joint loss behavior of correlated bank and other FSI’s equity re-
turns, which are dependent due to e.g. loan syndication, interbank loans and
macro interest rate exposure. Suppose the weak assumption holds that the asset
and liability return distributions are in the domain of attraction of a (univariate)
extreme value distribution. Then the banks’ equity returns interdependencies
display radically different behavior at high loss levels depending on whether the
portfolio components’s returns are e.g. normally, Student-t or uniformly (credit
risk) distributed. We classify the types of different behavior by means of the dif-
ferent domains of attraction of the univariate extreme value distributions. Both
continuous and discrete compounding are covered, so that all three limit distribu-
tions have relevance.2 We show that, due to the balance sheet (portfolio) induced
linearity, the type of extreme value distribution to which the marginal distribu-
tions of the risk factors are attracted determines whether the fragility is weak
or strong. For example, normally distributed asset and liability returns imply
weak fragility and low systemic risk. But this is quite different if the marginal
distributions are Student-t or uniformly distributed. We provide an exhaustive
characterization in terms of weak and strong fragility depending on the type of
the underlying univariate asset return distributions.
Banks provide an important positive externality to the macro economy through
their maintenance of the payment and settlement system and by channeling the
monetary policy decisions. The fallout from a bank failure can therefore sort large
negative effects.3 This not withstanding, central banks, ministries of finance, su-
pervisors and regulators are hard pressed when asked to characterize the fragility
2Credit risk under discrete compounding has a distribution with bounded support. In contrast,
the log returns of equity (market risk) have an unbounded support.
3For example, the US S&L crisis is estimated to have cost the US tax payer an amount in the
order of 4% of GDP, and the Swedish banking crisis of the 1990’s cost as much as 10% of GDP.
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of their financial system, even though one readily receives an answer concern-
ing individual bank risk in terms of the Value at Risk (VaR) level. Thus, as is
forcefully argued by Borio [6], there is great need for a measure which reflects
the amount of systemic risk inherent to a particular financial system and permits
comparisons across systems. Motivated by this need, we develop a scale, dubbed
the Fragility Index FI, which captures the amount of systemic risk at the system’s
level. The FI is comparable to the VaR measure for individual bank risk. The
scale circumvents the pitfalls of correlation analysis. It reflects different possible
intensity levels of systemic dependence, ranging from perfect dependence, to as-
ymptotic dependence, asymptotic independence and just independence and can
be applied to any dimension (number of FSI).
In general the dependency structure of a multivariate distribution and the mar-
ginal distributions are unrelated concepts, but the linearity of portfolios in the
asset returns or risk drivers induces a specific link between the two concepts. We
show that popular theoretical economic explanations for systemic breakdowns,
such as a macro (interest rate) shock, a sunspot or micro based contagion, fit
within our affine setup. The approach is of semi-reduced form, since it takes as
given a certain distribution of the assets and liabilities across the system in char-
acterizing the system’s stability. It does not analyze how such a network is the
outcome of incentives and institutions. The latter question is clearly also of inter-
est, but is outside the scope of a single paper and is well treated elsewhere (e.g.
we take as given there is an incentive to diversify); see e.g. Rochet and Tirole [28],
Lagunoff and Schreft [22], Freixas, Parigi and Rochet [13] and Allen and Gale
[1]. But given a particular FSI network structure, we show how the FI permits
a characterization of the systemic risk inherent to such a network. It is shown
that rankings based on the correlation structure may give an ordering which dif-
fers from the FI, since the FI recognizes better the diversification benefits in the
failure regions. The theory also implies the functional form of the economically
relevant copulas in the systemically relevant regions.4
4The variety of copulas is ‘large’ and the question is which types of copulas are economically
relevant for the problem at hand. As it happens, copulas are often chosen for their convenience
in estimation, but economic criteria have as of yet scarcely received attention when choosing a
particular copula.
4 J.L. GELUK, L. DE HAAN, AND C. G. DE VRIES
There exists some empirical research which has tried to measure the interdepen-
dence within and between financial systems by correlating bank stock returns, see
e.g. De Nicolo and Kwast [7]. Alternatives for the correlation analysis as measures
of systemic risk are copulas and multivariate extreme value analysis. Copulas give
the dependency structure embedded in the joint distribution function parametri-
cally; see Longin and Solnik [25] for an early empirical application based on the
logistic copula. Extreme value based statistical analysis is a semi-parametric ap-
proach which captures the dependency in the tail regions of the joint distribution
function without committing to a particular functional form. This literature finds
evidence for strong fragility, see Hartmann et al. [18] and Poon et al. [26]. Here
we provide the theory behind these empirical results.
The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows: In section 2 we discuss
discounting and the linearity of bank portfolios and affine fundamentals based
models such as the CAPM. A discussion and comparison of different measures to
characterize linkages during periods of market stress is provided in section 3. The
analytic claims of the paper on the relationship between the risk drivers’ marginal
tail properties and the degree of tail dependence are obtained in section 4. The
cases of weak and strong fragility are treated in separate subsections. Financial
economic analysis is given in section 5. Finally, section 6 provides a summary and
conclusions.
2. Affine Portfolios and Compounding
The FSI are linked in a number of ways. An important linkage is through their
mutual exposures, yielding similar investments and liabilities. Take e.g. a rein-
surance firm which reinsures part of an insurance policy written by an insurance
firm, retrocedes part of this reinsurance contract to another reinsurer and invests
the premia it receives on the reinsurance policy in a portfolio of stocks and bonds.
All this activity is undertaken to diversify the risk of holding an overly specialized
portfolio. The diversification activity on the liability side produces direct linkages
within the insurance and reinsurance sector. But since these companies invest the
premia in well diversified portfolios, there is also an indirect linkage by the risk
factors which drive the market risks. Similarly, commercial banks are typically
heavily exposed to each other through the interbank money market by which the
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banks manage their liquidity. Typically commercial banks loan to the same sec-
tors in the economy, which again produces the exposure to the same macro risk
drivers (through the movements in the value of the received collateral, e.g. house
prices in case of mortgages). Syndicated loans whereby several banks underwrite
a large loan directly, expose different banks to the same risk. Investment banks
often hold large trading portfolios and hold stakes in commercial companies which
belong to the clientele of the bank, yielding direct exposure to market risk. Last
but not least, banks in many countries do also hold sizable cross-participations in
each other.
In summary, the FSI hold portfolios which are linked and which are directly
or indirectly exposed to the same risks or risk factors. Insofar banks hold the
same assets or finance the same loans, the linearity is direct. Indirectly, the return
on capital of banks is also linearly related through their exposure to macro risk
factors. Finance theory, such as the CAPM and APT, often assumes that returns
are linearly related to the macro risk factors.5 The monetary model of exchange
rates for example, holds that exchange rate returns ∆s0j between the numeraire
currency 0 and the j-th currency are linearly related to changes in the relative
money supply m, real income y and the interest differential (R0 −Rj):
∆s0j = ∆(m0 − φy0 + λR0)−∆(mj − φyj + λRj) + ε0j.
This is not to say that there are no cases where the relationship between the
returns and factors is non-linear. For example, consider a portfolio which both
contains options and the underlying stocks.6 Such portfolios are analyzed in the
economics section below.
2.1. portfolios. Portfolios are by definition linear in the returns of the assets and
liabilities. Indirectly, portfolios are linear in the macro risk factors. Consider two
arbitrarily seized portfolios with returns
Qn =
n∑
i=1
λiXi, Wn =
n∑
i=1
γiXi,
5Boyer, Kumagai and Yuan [5] provide evidence that crises spread internationally through
asset holdings of investors.
6Option theory holds that the returns on both assets are linearly related to the market factor,
but this is only a local result.
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where the Xi are the individual asset returns or (macro) risk factors and the asset
weights satisfy
∑n
i=1 λi =
∑n
i=1 γi = 1. In these portfolios we can allow for short
selling and the portfolios can be ”unbalanced” in the sense that some assets are
not present in both portfolios. In some instances the case of unbalanced portfolios
is qualitatively different from the case of balanced portfolios.
We will repeatedly use the following two two-asset portfolios in examples to
illustrate the theoretical results. Consider the case of two syndicated loans with
independent returns X and Y respectively. Imagine that the loans for the projects
are underwritten by two investment banks or sold on to other FSI. Let bank one
hold the portfolio with return
(2.1) Q = (1− γ)X + γY,
while the loan portfolio return to bank two is
(2.2) W = γX + (1− γ)Y,
and where γ²(1/2, 1). This case will be referred to as the zero beta portfolio, given
the independence of the two risk drivers.
The second case considers two asset excess returns X and Y related through
the CAPM. Both returns have the following single factor structure
(2.3) X = βxR + εx
and
(2.4) Y = βyR + εy.
Here R is the excess return on the market portfolio over the risk free rate and εx
and εy are the idiosyncratic risks (independently distributed from the market risk
and each other); beta’s indicate how much the projects co-vary with the market
risk. For simplicity we repeatedly take the beta’s equal βx = βy = β in the
examples.
2.2. discrete and continuous returns. Depending on the problem at hand,
either continuous or discrete returns are analyzed. Some classes of assets, such as
in the case of stocks, have almost continuous price formation in time and hence
continuous compounding is typically used for these assets. Other assets only
trade or payout at discrete instances in time, for which discrete returns are more
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appropriate. Portfolio returns can be obtained by summing the weighted discrete
returns; using logarithmic returns this is not possible. Per contrast, aggregation
over time works well with continuous returns, whereas discrete returns do not
add up. For small price movements, the two concepts of a return are close (as a
Taylor approximation shows). Let P (t) denote the asset price at time t, and let
X be the return. The continuously compounded return is given by X(t + 1) =
logP (t + 1)/P (t), where X ∈ R. Discrete returns are computed as Y (t + 1) =
P (t + 1)/P (t) − 1, where (Y + 1) ∈ R+. We investigate the implications for the
joint loss distribution under continuous compounding and discrete compounding.
Under continuous compounding the loss return can be as large as can be imag-
ined, but the discrete return can not be worse than −1. This lower bound is
of particular relevance for credit risk. In the worst case the payoff to a bond is
zero and the return on the principal is minus one. Note that the positive returns
on such credit instruments at maturity are bounded as well. Such bounds have
immediate implications for the possible tail shapes of the multivariate return dis-
tribution on the loss side. Though most of the time we deal with continuously
distributed returns, we also briefly investigate the systemic stability if there are
mass points. The motivation for this is twofold. Many of the theoretical crises
models employ the Bernoulli distribution, i.e. there are only a single good and
a bad state of the world. In reality, options and other non-linear instruments
may have mass points in their return distribution if held to maturity, whereas the
distribution of the underlying asset would not.
3. Measures of Dependency
We first argue why there is a need for a measure of dependency to reflect systemic
risk and why standard concepts like the correlation measure are less suitable for
the question at hand. Then we design a scale which is close in spirit to the popular
VaR measure, but which is suitable at the systems level.
Indeed, why would economists be interested in a measure for systemic risk?
Take the banking sector’s risk regulatory background as laid down in the recently
revamped Basel accords for bank capital holding. The surprising fact is that
the entire approach has a predominant microprudential orientation, focussing on
the risk management practices at individual banks, without much attention for
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the systemic ramifications, even though the systemic stability is often invoked as
the prime motive for the necessity of the Basel rules. The banking sector has
important externalities within the banking sector and to the rest of the economy
through its maintenance of the clearing and settlement services. These services
depend on the reliability of the system as a whole. Moreover, an important part
of the risks are endogenous to the sector.7 Given the specific sensitivity of the
banking sector to the macro and endogenous risks, Borio [6] pleads for giving an
explicit role to the macropudential aspects of bank regulation and supervision on
top of the microprudential framework which is now firmly in place through the
Basel II accord. The existing micro prudential operational framework focusses
on the VaR of each institution individually. The new macro prudential approach
should also care about the tail losses of the banking system as a whole.
The Basel II and Solvency II accords’ microprudential oriented regulatory frame-
work are based on the philosophy that the chain is as strong as its weakest link,
which would imply that regulators focus on containing
1− P (B1 ≤ s,B2 ≤ s),
and where Bi is the i-th bank return exposure. The Basel II accord in practice
is even more conservative as it aims to minimize P (B1 > s) and P (B2 > s)
individually, and where s is the VaR level. In other words
1− P (B1 ≤ s,B2 ≤ s) ≤ P (B1 > s) + P (B2 > s).
Thus the practice is an overly conservative approach, since it safeguards against
a systems breakdown twice:
1− P (B1 ≤ s,B2 ≤ s) + P (B1 > s,B2 > s) = P (B1 > s) + P (B2 > s).
Note that in higher dimensions this effect is even stronger, as the joint failure
region is taken into account as many times as the number of FSI which are part
of the system. From an efficiency point of view overregulation is not desirable,
as is too weak supervision. It is therefore of interest to measure the joint failure
7To give one stark example from the investment industry, recall the popularity and fall from
grace of the portfolio insurance technique for managing risk. While evidently prudential from a
micro oriented point of view, the technique faltered when all institutions were trying hedge by
selling off at the same time on black Monday in October 1987.
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probability P (B1 > s,B2 > s) separately and to adjust the individual bank based
approach for systemic risk. We discuss a number of alternative ways to evaluate
this joint failure probability.
3.1. the correlation measure. In case the return distribution is multivariate
normal, the joint failure probability can be calculated on basis of the correlation
matrix. The coefficient of correlation ρ is perhaps the most commonly used mea-
sure of (linear) dependence. One must ask, however, how well ρ captures the
dependency if it is unknown whether the data are normally distributed or not.
Specifically, the question is whether ρ adequately captures the interdependency at
crisis levels. Embrechts, McNeil and Strauman [11] discuss the pitfalls of the nor-
mal based correlation analysis as a means to measure systemic risk. The empirical
literature moreover, finds little support for normality of the return distribution of
many asset classes, which makes correlation analysis less suitable.
A somewhat realistic, note the martingale structure, financial economic example
is the following bivariate ARCH inspired volatility model:
Xt = NtHt, Nt i.i.d. N(0, 1),
Yt =MtHt, Mt i.i.d N(0, 1),
with common volatility factor:
Ht = w + β(X
2
t−1 + Y
2
t−1), 0 ≤ β < 1/2.
The (stationary) returns X and Y exhibit the characteristic heavy tail property,
the clustering of volatility, are interdependent, but nevertheless uncorrelated. The
ρt−k(Xt, Yt) = 0, k = 1, 2... even though Xt and Yt are dependent since they are
driven by the same conditional variance function Ht.
8 Thus, ρ does not capture
the dependency which is in the data.
Another problem is that the correlation concept requires that the first two
moments exist. This is at least of some concern for the non-life branch of the
insurance industry, where the loss distribution often appears to fail to have a
second bounded moment. Lastly, economists evaluating investments within the
expected utility theory framework are not so much interested in the correlation
8Note that regarding volatility spill-overs the correlations measure gives ρt−1(X2t , Y
2
t ) = 0,
but ρt−k(X2t , Y
2
t ) 6= 0 for k > 1.
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measure itself; they rather have an interest in the trade-offs between risk measured
as a probability and the associated gains or losses, which are the quantiles of the
return distribution. As such, the correlation is therefore only an intermediate step
in the calculation of this trade-off between quantile and probability. Therefore we
like to turn to measures which are not conditioned on a particular multivariate
distribution and which directly reflect the probabilities and associated crash levels.
3.2. Copulas. Copulas provide a parametric specification of the dependency struc-
ture of multivariate distributions. The popularity of the copula approach partly
derives from the fact that copula lend themselves easily to parametric estima-
tion. Given our objective to uncover the dependency in the tail area, however, the
parametric copula approach shares the same problem with parametric distribu-
tion based approaches, like the Gaussian approach, in that it does not necessarily
do justice to the behavior in the tail area. Moreover, as of to date there does
not exist an economic motivation for choosing one copula over the other. Often
a particular copula specification is chosen for estimation convenience rather than
for economic relevance. We shed some light on both issues below, by deriving the
relevant copula for the tail area from the underlying economic structure. For su-
pervisors and regulators, using a function rather than an index, the disadvantage
is that a function is in general less succinct, and hence may not be acceptable as
a summary measure for dependency. It can also be less robust if one lacks part
of the necessary information to construct the function. Lastly, copulas are again
only an intermediate step in linking loss amounts and their probabilities.
3.3. The Fragility Index FI. For all the reasons given above, we turn to develop
an index of fragility (FI) which does not hinge on a particular distribution or
dependence structure, and which does link losses and probabilities directly. The
FI at the system’s level is comparable to the VaR measure for individual bank risk.
The FI, though, is stated inversely in terms of large loss probabilities, rather than
loss levels. This allows for possibly different loss levels for different FSI, while still
providing a single index number for the entire system.
3.3.1. co-crash probabilities. In the introduction to this section we argued exten-
sively that the macro prudential concern is a heavy loss in one bank going hand
in hand with a heavy losses of other banks, creating a breakdown of the financial
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system. Since we are interested in the probabilities on such joint extreme out-
comes, we directly evaluate these probabilities, bypassing the correlation concept.
In higher dimensions, though, there are many of such probabilities (bivariate,
trivariate, etc.) and somehow one wants to keep the information manageable.
To strike a balance between these desiderata we propose to adopt a particular
conditional expectation.
Specifically, we ask given that Y > t, what is the probability that X > s, or vice
versa, and where X and Y stand for asset returns and t, s are high loss levels. The
probability measure which conditions on any market crash, without indicating the
specific institution is the linkage measure9
P{X > s}+ P {Y > t}
1− P{X ≤ s, Y ≤ t}
first proposed in Huang [19] and evaluated empirically by Hartmann et al. [18].
Here we broaden its sensitivity and extension to higher dimensions.
The linkage measure, even though it is the sum of two conditional probabilities,
reflects the expected number of crashes given at least one collapse. To see this, let
κs denote the number of simultaneously crashing bank stock returns, that is bank
returns exceeding s. Write the conditionally expected number of bank crashes
given a collapse in at least one bank as E {κs|κs ≥ 1}. Then
E {κs|κs ≥ 1} = E {1X>s + 1Y >s|κs ≥ 1}
= E {1X>s|κs ≥ 1}+ E {1Y >s|κs ≥ 1}
= P {X > s|κs ≥ 1}+ P {Y > s|κs ≥ 1}(3.1)
=
P{X > s}+ P {Y > s}
1− P{X ≤ s, Y ≤ s}
Compare this expression with another quantity which is sometimes used to
measure dependence in the tail:
(3.2) θs :=
P {X > s and Y > s}
P {X > s or Y > s} .
We have
(3.3) E {κs|κs ≥ 1} = 1 + θs.
9Below we take the all quantiles on which we condition equal to s, but this is by no means
necessary. If two banks have quite different levels of capital, one may want to take the loss return
thresholds with a systemic impact differently.
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The advantage of the expectation measure is that it can be easily extended to
higher dimensions, while the θs is more cumbersome and less revealing, see below.
Under quite general conditions, including extreme value conditions, the limit
(3.4) κ = lim
s→∞E {κs|κs ≥ 1} = 1 + lims→∞ θs
exists. This limit can be used as an indicator for the amount of dependence in the
tail between X and Y . One reason to take the limit, rather than using a finite loss
level s, is that economics does not say what the critical level is at which systemic
failure sets in. Taking the limit thereby removes some arbitrariness. At the same
time, the limit is still indicative about what happens at high but finite loss levels,
see Balkema and De Haan (1974).
Note that
lim
s→∞E {κs|κs ≥ 1} = 1
is interpreted as asymptotic independence. In the case that
lim
s→∞E {κs|κs ≥ 1} = 2,
one has maximal asymptotic dependence. Hence
(3.5) H := lim
s→∞E {κs|κs ≥ 1} − 1
is a number between 0 and 1. It can be used as a measure of asymptotic de-
pendence in the tail in a way analogous to the correlation coefficient for the tail
distribution. However, there is no direct connection: Even for a normal distribu-
tion with coefficient of correlation r 6= 0, 1, or −1 one nevertheless has H = 0; see
below.
In the higher dimensional situation with d > 2 random variables, H can be
defined in a completely analogous way:
H :=
lims→∞E {κs|κs ≥ 1} − 1
d− 1
and the interpretation is the same. Note that the straightforward generalization
of (3.2):
lim
s→∞ θs := lims→∞
P {X1 > s, . . . , Xd > s}
P {X1 > s or . . . or Xd > s}
is not directly linked to H and that lims→∞ θs can be zero even if the random
variables are not jointly independent in the tail (even if the random variables are
pairwise asymptotically dependent, this limit can still be zero for d > 2).
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As observed above, for any normal distribution and many other distributions,
we find H = 0. Even in the case of asymptotic independence one can make a
distinction between probability distributions which exhibit more and less depen-
dence by applying a finer scale in the framework of extreme value theory. In the
simple case the domain of attraction condition can be written (cf. Resnick, 1987)
(3.6) lim
t→∞ t {1− F (tx, ty)} = − logG(x, y)
for x, y > 0 where F is the initial distribution and G is the limit distribution.
Assume a ‘second order’ or ‘speed of convergence’ condition: Suppose there exists
a positive function A and a limit function H (not identically 0) such that
(3.7) lim
t→∞
t(1− F (tx, ty)) + logG(x, y)
A(t)
→ H(x, y)
for 0 < x, y ≤ ∞ (we include x = ∞ and y = ∞ since otherwise we would not
control the marginal distributions). It can be proved that A is regularly varying
with index ρ ≤ 0. In the case of asymptotic independence
(3.8) G(x, y) = G(x,∞)G(∞, y) = e− 1x− 1y .
Moreover, (3.7) with y =∞ or x =∞ also entails
lim
t→∞
t(1− F (tx,∞)) + logG(x,∞)
A(t)
→ H(x,∞)
lim
t→∞
t(1− F (∞, ty)) + logG(x, y)
A(t)
→ H(∞, y)(3.9)
Then, upon combining (3.7), (3.8) and (3.9), it follows that
(3.10)
tP (X > tx, Y > ty)
A(t)
→ H(x,∞) +H(∞, y)−H(x, y).
Now according to (3.6), P {X > tx or Y > ty} is asymptotically of order t−1,
i.e., regularly varying with index−1, whereas according to (3.10), P {X > tx and Y > ty}
is asymptotically of order t−1A(t), i.e. regularly varying with index ρ− 1.
For the bivariate case, Ledford and Tawn [23] introduced the parameter η de-
fined as
η =
1
1− ρ ∈ [0, 1]
as a measure to distinguish between asymptotically independent distributions.
Note that if H > 0, then η = 1. Note also that for a bivariate normal distribution
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η = (1 + r)/2, where r is the coefficient of correlation. Moreover, if X and Y are
independent, η = 1/2, but the converse does not hold.
3.3.2. the FI scale. If we combine the H scale and the η scale, we can define the
Fragility Index FI:
FI =

lims→∞E {κs|κs ≥ 1} if H > 0
1
2
lims→∞
logP{X>s}+logP{Y >s}
logP{X>s,Y >s} if H = 0.
We will say that the financial system is strongly fragile if FI > 1, while the
system is only weakly fragile if FI²[0, 1]. This index will be used as our scale for
the amount of fragility.
We already noted that E {κs|κs ≥ 1} can be easily extended to higher dimen-
sions. We turn to the extension of Ledford and Tawn’s η measure to higher
dimensions. We start from the extension of (3.7):
lim
t→∞
tP {X > tx or Y > ty or Z > tz} − ( 1
x
+ 1
y
+ 1
z
)
A(t)
= H(x, y, z).
As in (3.9) and the reasoning thereafter, we use
P{X > tx or Y > ty or Z > tz} − P{X > tx} − P{Y > ty} − P{Z > tz}
= −P {X > tx, Y > ty} − P {X > tx, Z > tz} − P {Y > ty, Z > tz}
+P {X > tx, Y > ty, Z > tz} .(3.11)
Suppose that all two-dimensional marginal distributions satisfy (3.10), i.e.
lim
t→∞
tP (X > tx, Y > ty)
A(t)
→ H(x,∞,∞) +H(∞, y,∞)−H(x, y,∞)
lim
t→∞
tP (Y > ty, Z > tz)
A(t)
→ H(∞, y,∞) +H(∞,∞, z)−H(∞, y, z)
lim
t→∞
tP (X > tx, Z > tz)
A(t)
→ H(∞, x,∞) +H(∞,∞, z)−H(x,∞, z)
Then (cf. (3.11)) it remains to deal with P {X > tx, Y > ty, Z > tz}. It is possible
that this probability is of the same order as the two-dimensional distributions, i.e.
of order t−1A(t), or this probability is of lower order and then we are dealing with
a new parameter, smaller than the η that comes from A, determining the joint
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excess of all three variables. Similar arguments can be made for any d > 2. The
d-dimensional extension of FI thus reads
(3.12) FI =

lims→∞
P{X1>s}+...+P{Xd>s}
1−P{X1≤s,...,Xd≤s} if H > 0
1
d
lims→∞
logP{X1>s}+...+logP{Xd>s}
logP{X1>s,...,Xd>s} if H = 0.
This is the scale we will employ throughout the rest of the paper to judge the
amount of systemic fragility. Note that if H > 0 the fragility is strong, whereas
H = 0 refers to weak fragility.
4. Weak and Strong Financial Fragility
To determine the amount of fragility of a network in the affine FSI portfolio
framework, we need a theory about the dependence between weighted sums of
random variables (asset returns, risk factors) in the tail areas. This section first
deals with discrete returns, then turns to continuous returns. The part on con-
tinuous returns is divided into a part with light and a part with heavy tails. The
main results are summarized at the end of the section in terms of their economic
implications.
The fragility of a bivariate system is linked to the joint tail behavior of linear
portfolio combinations Q =
∑
λiXi and W =
∑
µiXi. It is assumed that the loss
returns Xi (i = 1, . . . , n) are (cross sectionally) i.i.d.
10 We are interested in high
values of the vector (Q,W ) and in particular in the dependence between Q andW
in the tail area. Assume that the distribution of Xi is in the domain of attraction
of an extreme value distribution Gτ .
11 The marginal distributions which are in this
class do have a proper limit distribution for the linearly scaled maximum (loss).12
In order to be able to calculate the fragility we need to find the joint tail behavior
of Q and W for different values of τ . For the cases τ > 0 and τ < 0 we give a
complete characterization; in case τ = 0 we cover the cases of subexponential and
10In case the factors or returns in our linear portfolios are time dependent but stationary, this
does not affect the results in the paper.
11Where τ < 0 refers to the Weibull limit law, τ > 0 is the Frechet case, and τ = 0 represents
the Gumbel limit law. The extreme value theorem holds that the limit law for the maximum is
either one of these distributions.
12The tail behavior is closely related to the type of relevant Gτ .
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superexponential distributions (to be defined below)13. Throughout we use the
notation
(4.1) α =: 1/|τ | if τ 6= 0.
4.1. Discrete returns, Case τ < 0. We start by showing that the class of
distributions in the domain of attraction of the Weibull limit law is closed under
addition.
4.1.1. Closure under addition. Let F (x) be a loss distribution with bounded sup-
port [0, a], hence F (a) = 1, 0 < a < ∞. Suppose F (x) is in the domain of
attraction of a Weibull extreme value distribution. It is first shown that convolu-
tions remain in this domain of attraction.
Define the ”upper tail distribution” H(x) as
H(x) ≡ 1− F (−x+ a)
Introduce its Laplace transform H˜(y)
(4.2) H˜(y) ≡
∫ ∞
0
ye−yxH(x)dx.
Hence for t > 0 by a transformation of variable
(4.3)
H˜(y/t)
H(t)
= y
∫ ∞
0
e−yx
H(tx)
H(t)
dx.
Recall that if F (x) = P{Xi ≤ x}, for i = 1, 2 and if X1 and X2 are independent,
their convolution is F 2∗(x) := P{X1 +X2 ≤ x}. We have the following result:
Lemma 1. Suppose H(x) is in the domain of attraction of the Weibull extreme
value distribution, i.e.
(4.4) lim
t↓0
H(tx)/H(t) = xα, α > 0.
Then the convolution H2∗ of H(x) is again in the domain of attraction of the
Weibull extreme value distribution and satisfies
lim
t↓0
H2∗(tx)
H2∗(t)
= x2α.
13Only subsets of the Gumbel class are covered as it is unknown whether this class is closed
under addition.
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Proof. By (4.3), (4.4) and a transformation of variable
lim
t↓0
H˜(y/t)
H(t)
= y
∫ ∞
0
e−yx lim
t↓0
H(tx)
H(t)
dx
= y
∫ ∞
0
e−yxxαdx
= y−αΓ(1 + α)(4.5)
The justification for interchanging the limit and the integral is as in Feller (1971,
XIII.5). Hence the Laplace transform H˜ varies regularly at infinity with tail index
−α whenever H varies regularly at zero with index α. By the convolution theorem
for Laplace transforms
H˜2∗(y) =
(
H˜(y)
)2
.
Hence, H˜2∗(y) varies regularly at infinity with index −2α. By (4.5) this implies
that the convolution H2∗(x) varies regularly at zero with index 2α. ¤
Thus the class is closed under addition, but the index of regular variation
changes!
Remark 1. This convolution result implies that if portfolios contain an equal
number of assets (with returns in that class), the portfolios have the same index of
regular variation, while if two portfolios differ with respect to the number of assets,
their indices differ.
4.1.2. Domain of attraction. We now set out to prove that the portfolio return
distribution is in the domain of attraction of a multivariate extreme value distri-
bution, if the univariate distributions of the composite parts are in the domain of
attraction of the Weibull extreme value distribution. For simplicity of writing we
assume that the right end point of the distribution function (which must be finite)
is zero. Recall that α = −1/τ when τ < 0. Then for x > 0, i = 1, 2
lim
n→∞nP {−Xi ≤ xa(n)} = x
α
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where a(x) is the inverse function of the distribution function of −Xi at the point
1− 1/x. Hence as n→∞ for x, y > 0
n2P{−X1 ≤ xa(n) and −X2 ≤ ya(n)}
= nP{−X1 ≤ xa(n)}nP{−X2 ≤ ya(n)}
→ α2
∫ y
0
∫ x
0
sα−1tα−1dsdt = (xy)α.(4.6)
We claim that the distribution of the random vector
(Q,W ) := (λ1X1 + λ2X2, µ1X1 + µ2X2) (λi, µi > 0)
is in the domain of attraction of an extreme value distribution. In particular we
claim that for x, y > 0 as n→∞
P n
2{Q ≤ −a(n)x,W ≤ −a(n)y} → exp
(
−α2
∫
S
(st)α−1 dsdt
)
,
where S = {(s, t) : λ1s+ λ2t ≤ x or µ1s+ µ2t ≤ y, s > 0, t > 0}. Or equivalently
lim
n→∞n
2P{− (λ1X1 + λ2X2) ≤ a(n)x or − (µ1X1 + µ2X2) ≤ a(n)y}
= α2
∫
S
(st)α−1dsdt(4.7)
The limit (4.6) entails
lim
n→∞n
2P{x1a(n) ≤ −X1 < x2a(n), y1a(n) ≤ −X2 < y2a(n)}
= α2
∫ y2
y1
∫ x2
x1
sα−1tα−1dsdt,(4.8)
for 0 ≤ x1 < x2 < ∞, 0 ≤ y1 < y2 < ∞, i.e. we have convergence for rectangles
and for finite unions of rectangles.
It clearly suffices for the proof of (4.7) to give a proof for sets Am and Bm such
that Am ⊂ S ⊂ Bm and Bm\Am ↓ ∅,m→∞. Note that in case λ1µ2 6= λ2µ1 and
x/y ∈ (λ1/µ1, λ2/µ2), the boundary of S consists of 4 line segments. The vertices
are (0, 0), (a, 0) := (max( x
λ1
, y
µ1
), 0), (0, b) := (0,max( x
λ2
, y
µ2
)) and
(4.9) (s0, t0) :=
1∣∣∣∣∣∣ λ1 λ2µ1 µ2
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣ x λ2y µ2
∣∣∣∣∣∣,−
∣∣∣∣∣∣ x λ1y µ1
∣∣∣∣∣∣
 .
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We concentrate on the subarea S1 with vertices (0, 0), (0, b), (s0, t0) and (s0, 0).
Define for i = 1, . . . ,m
si :=
(m− i)s0
m
and ti :=
t0 − b
s0
si + b
and the sets
Li := (s, t) : si ≤ s < si−1, 0 ≤ t ≤ ti
and
Ui := (s, t) : si ≤ s < si−1, 0 ≤ t ≤ ti+1.
Then ∪mi=1Li ⊂ S1 ⊂ ∪mi=1Ui, and by (4.8)
lim
n→∞n
2P{a(n)−1(X1, X2) ∈ ∪mi=1Li} = α2
∫
(s,t)∈∪mi=1Li
(st)α−1 dsdt
and
lim
n→∞n
2P{a(n)−1(X1, X2) ∈ ∪mi=1Ui} = α2
∫
(s,t)∈∪mi=1Ui
(st)α−1 dsdt.
Since clearly ∪mi=1Ui\ ∪mi=1 Li → ∅ as m→∞, we have proved (4.7).
Let us now simplify the integral at the right-hand side of (4.7). Write D1 for
the triangle with vertices (0, b), (s0, t0), (0, t0); D2 for the rectangle with vertices
(0, 0), (s0, 0), (s0, t0), (0, t0); D3 for the triangle with vertices (s0, 0), (s0, t0), (c, 0).
Then
α2
∫ ∫
(s,t)∈S1
sα−1tα−1dsdt =: I1 + I2 − I3,
where I1, I2, and I3 are the integrals over D1 ∪D2, D3 ∪D2, and D2 respectively.
The first integral can be written as
I1 = α
2
∫ s0
0
sα−1
∫ b−s(b−t0)/s0
0
tα−1dtds
= α
∫ s0
0
sα−1
(
b− s
s0
(b− t0)
)α
ds
= α
(
b2s0
b− t0
)α ∫ 1−t0/b
0
sα−1(1− s)αds.
Define the function ϕ:
ϕ(s, α) :=
∫ s
0
θα−1 (1− θ)α dθ.
Note that this is a special case of the incomplete beta function. Then
I1 = α
(
b2s0
b− t0
)α
ϕ(1− t0/b, α),
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and, similarly
I2 = α
(
c2t0
c− s0
)α
ϕ(1− s0/c, α).
It follows that the right-hand side of (4.7) is
(4.10) α
(
b2s0
b− t0
)α
ϕ(1− t0/b, α) + α
(
c2t0
c− s0
)α
ϕ(1− s0/c, α)− (s0t0)α .
Reformulation of both sides in (4.7) shows that we have proved the following
theorem.
Theorem 1. With the notation given in the introduction of the section, in case
τ < 0, it follows that the vector (Q,W ) is in the bivariate domain of attraction of
an extreme value distribution, i.e. for x, y > 0
P n{λ1X1 + λ2X2 ≤ −a(
√
n)x, µ1X1 + µ2X2 ≤ −a(
√
n)y}
→ exp
{
−α2
∫
S
(st)α−1dsdt
}
, as n→∞,
where S = {(s, t) : λ1s + λ2t ≤ x or µ1s + µ2t ≤ y, s > 0, t > 0} so that the
logarithm of the right-hand side equals minus (4.10) with (s0, t0) as in (4.9).
So we conclude that the vector (λ1X1+λ2X2, µ1X1+µ2X2) is in the domain of
attraction of a multivariate extreme value distribution, with extreme value index
τ/2 and non-discrete spectral measure.
To provide some intuition and interpretation, we conclude this section by cal-
culating the fragility for the two example portfolios.
Example 1. Consider the zero beta portfolios (2.1) and (2.2), where γ ∈ (1
2
, 1),
and X, Y are as X1, X2 in Theorem 1. Note that in this case we take limits as
s ↑ 0. Similar to (3.1) and (3.4) we have
(4.11) κ = lim
s↑0
E {κs|κs ≥ 1} = lim
s↑0
P {Q > s}+ P {W > s}
P {Q > s or W > s}
First suppose 1
2
< γ < 1. In order to evaluate κ we use (4.7) with λ1 = µ2 =
1− γ, λ2 = µ1 = γ and x = y = 1 to find that
n2P{− ((1− γ)X1 + γX2) ≤ a(n) or − (γX1 + (1− γ)X2) ≤ a(n)}
→ 2α [γ (1− γ)]−α
∫ γ
0
sα−1 (1− s)α ds− 1.
For the marginal distribution we find similarly
n2P{− ((1− γ)X1 + γX2) ≤ a(n)}
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→ α2
∫ 1/γ
0
∫ 1−γt
1−γ
0
(st)α−1dsdt =
Γ (α+ 1)2
[γ(1− γ)]αΓ(2α + 1) .
By combining these results, the FI index is found as
(4.12) κ =
2Γ(α + 1)2
Γ(2α + 1){2α ∫ γ0 sα−1(1− s)αds− [γ(1− γ)]α} .
Example 2. Consider again the zero beta portfolios Q and W , but now suppose
more specifically that the marginal loss distributions of X and Y are uniformly
distributed on [0, 1]. By computing the areas above the portfolio lines in the upper
right hand corner of the unit square by direct integration, one readily finds
P{Q > t} = P{W > t} = 1
2
1
γ (1− γ) (1− t)
2
and
P{Q > t,W > t} = 1
γ
(1− t)2 .
Thus
FI = lim
t↑1
E {κt|κt ≥ 1} = 1
1−
1
γ
(1−t)2
1
γ(1−γ) (1−t)2
=
1
γ
> 1
as γ² (1/2, 1) and the portfolios are asymptotically dependent. Note that if one
takes α = 1 in (4.12), which is the extreme value index for the uniform distribution,
one obtains κ = 1/γ, confirming this specific case for the uniform distribution.
Remark 2. Consider the case of unbalanced portfolios. Suppose the portfolio W
is changed into W = X, but the portfolio Q remains as it is. For the uniform
distribution based example, the unbalanced portfolio implies P{W > t} = 1 − t,
while P{Q > t} remains as before. The joint loss probability becomes
P{Q > t,W > t} =
(
1
2γ
+
1
2
)
(1− t)2 .
In this case κ = limt↑1E {κt|κt ≥ 1} = 1, as P{W > t} is of larger order than
the other two probabilities; recall the Remark 1 at the beginning of the subsection.
Thus the portfolios are asymptotically independent. One also calculates that the
FI in this case is 3/4, reflecting the weak fragility.
Example 3. Consider the equal beta asset returns X and Y from (2.3) and (2.4)
respectively, with βx = βy = β. Suppose the market factor R, idiosyncratic risk εx
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and εy are independently uniformly distributed on [0, 1]. In this case, the area of
the upper triangle in the (R, εx) space gives for 1 + β > s > max[1, β]
P{βR + εx > s} = P{βR + εy > s} = 1
2β
(1 + β − s)2 .
The joint failure probability is
P{βR + εx > s, βR + εy > s} = 1
3β
(1 + β − s)3 .
Note that the joint failure probability is of smaller order than the individual failure
probability due to the fact that the idiosyncratic risks εx and εy, per definition do
not drive both asset returns. This implies that the FI will be below one and that
the system’s fragility is only weak:
FI = lim
s→1+β
1
2
2 ln 1
2β
(1 + β − s)2
ln 1
3β
(1 + β − s)3 =
2
3
.
4.2. Continuous returns with light tails, Case τ = 0. The class of contin-
uous distributions which are in the domain of attraction of the Gumbel extreme
value distribution can be divided into two subclasses. One subclass exists of
subexponential distributions, and the complement constitutes the other subclass.
The subexponential distributions comprise a subset of the distributions which are
partly in the domain of attraction of the Gumbel limit law, i.e. for which τ = 0,
and contain the entire class of distributions in the domain of the Frechet limit law,
i.e. for which τ > 0. The subexponential distributions are exhaustively treated in
the next section. If a distribution is subexponential, then for all ε > 0
eεx(1− F (x))→∞ as x→∞.
This justifies the name subexponential, since the tail of F (x) decays at rate slower
than any exponential, see Embrechts et al. [10]. In particular for Weibull type
distributions we have 1− F (x) ∼ exp{−xβ}, so that the above condition holds if
0 < β < 1.
In case β = 1, we are in a class similar to the exponential distribution, see De
Vries [33]. The case β > 1 is treated as an example of the superexponential class
defined below. This class of distributions also comprises the normal distribution as
a special case. The case of the normal distribution was first treated by Sibuya [34].
The complement of the subexponential class within the domain of attraction of the
Gumbel law is, however, larger than the superexponential class. But its closure
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properties under addition are not known. The treatment below is motivated by
the results in Rootzen [30], for which the closure property holds.
4.2.1. The superexponential distributions. The definition of the superexponential
class is based on Rootzen [30]. Consider the following class of distributions.
Definition 1. A distribution function F is superexponential if it satisfies the fol-
lowing conditions:
(1) F has a density f which satisfies
(4.13) f(x) ∼ Kxαe−xp , as x→∞, with p > 1,
for some constants K > 0, α and p.
(2) The function D defined by D(x) = f(x)ex
p
satisfies
(4.14) lim sup
x→∞
∣∣∣∣∣xD′(x)D(x)
∣∣∣∣∣ <∞.
For x < 0, it is assumed that (4.13) and (4.14) hold with the same p, but
possibly with different D(x), α and K.
For further reference let q be the conjugate exponent of p, defined by 1/p+1/q =
1. Note that p > 1 in the above definition, which implies q > 1.
For the so defined class of superexponential distributions, Rootzen [30] proves
that the portfolios with n assets and positive portfolio weights summing to one∑n
i=1 λi =
∑n
i=1 µi = 1, are in the domain of attraction of the Gumbel limit law.
Moreover, Rootzen showed that
(4.15) P{
n∑
i=1
λiXi > x} ∼ A(λ)
(
x
(
∑n
i=1 λ
q
i )
1/q
)θ
exp
(
− x
p
(
∑n
i=1 λ
q
i )
p/q
)
,
as x→∞, where
θ = n(
1
2
+ α− p
2q
)− p
2
and A(λ) equals
Kn
(
2pi
p(p− 1)p−q
)(n−1)/2
p−nq/2+(q/p−1)/2

n∏
i=1
λi
(
∑n
i=1 λ
q
i )
2/q

(α+1/2)p/q−1/2
.
We can now turn to the question of asymptotic dependence. The derivation
follows the same strategy as was used by Sibuya [34] in the proof for the normal
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distribution. Suppose that
(4.16) (
n∑
i=1
λqi )
1/q ≥ (
n∑
i=1
µqi )
1/q.
If the opposite inequality holds, it is treated similarly. First note that the condi-
tional expectation measure (3.1) can be bounded from above as follows:
E {κs|κs ≥ 1} = 1
1− P{
∑n
i=1
λiXi>s,
∑n
i=1
µiXi>s}
P{∑ni=1 λiXi>s}+P{∑ni=1 µiXi>s}
≤ 1
1− P{
∑n
i=1
(λi+µi)Xi>2s}
P{∑ni=1 λiXi>s}+P{∑ni=1 µiXi>s}
≤ 1
1− P{
∑n
i=1
(λi+µi)Xi/2>s}
P{∑ni=1 λiXi>s}
.(4.17)
Consider first the case
(4.18) λi = cµi for i = 1, ..., n and some c > 0.
Since the wealth constraints imply
∑n
i=1 λi =
∑n
i=1 µi = 1, it follows that in this
case c = 1 and λi = µi for all i. But the case of complete dependence is obviously
not of interest. Hence, assume that (4.18) does not hold. In that case Minkowski’s
inequality gives
(4.19) (
n∑
i=1
λqi )
1/q + (
n∑
i=1
µqi )
1/q > (
n∑
i=1
(λi + µi)
q)1/q.
Note that (4.16) and (4.19) imply
(
n∑
i=1
λqi )
1/q >
1
2
(
n∑
i=1
(λi + µi)
q)1/q.
From Rootzen [30] we have as s→∞
P{
n∑
i=1
(λi + µi)Xi/2 > s} ∼
A(λ+ µ)
(
2s
(
∑n
i=1(λi + µi)
q)1/q
)θ
exp
(
− 2
psp
(
∑n
i=1(λi + µi)
q)p/q
)
.
Note that, if
P{Zj > s} ∼ Kjxθ exp
(
−
(
s
aj
)p)
, s→∞, for j = 1, 2
and if a1 > a2, then
lim
s→∞
P{Z2 > s}
P{Z1 > s} = 0.
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A combination of the above gives
(4.20) lim
s→∞
P{∑ni=1(λi + µi)Xi/2 > s}
P{∑ni=1 λiXi > s} = 0.
In view of (4.17), we have proved the following theorem.
Theorem 2. Suppose the i.i.d. random asset returns Xi have a distribution in
the superexponential class as in Definition 1, then for portfolios
∑n
i=1 λiXi and∑n
i=1 µiX it holds that κ = lims→∞E {κs|κs ≥ 1} = 1.
Example 4. Consider again the zero beta portfolios (2.1) and (2.2). Suppose that
the marginal loss distributions of X and Y are standard normally distributed. One
readily finds
P{Q > s} = P{W > s} ∼ 1√
2pi
√
(1− γ)2 + γ2
s
exp
(
− s
2/2
(1− γ)2 + γ2
)
as t→∞. Similarly
P{Q+W > 2s} = P{X + Y > 2s} ∼ 1
2
√
pis
exp(−s2)
and hence (4.20) follows. Thus the system is only weakly fragile. In order to
compute the joint failure probability for the FI we need more precision in computing
the joint failure probability than is provided through the above bound. Ruben [31]
gives accurate multivariate first order expressions for the joint probabilities; see
also (5.2) below. Using these approximations, we have
P{Q > s,W > s} ∼ 1
2pis2
1√
(1− γ)2 + γ2
exp(−s2)
as s→∞. Thus, recalling γ 6= 1/2,
FI = lim
s→∞
1
2
logP{Q > s}+ logP{W > s}
logP{Q > s,W > s}
=
1
2
1
(1− γ)2 + γ2 < 1.
Example 5. Consider the equal beta asset returns X and Y from (2.3) and (2.4)
respectively, with βx = βy = β. Suppose the market factor R, idiosyncratic risk εx
and εy are independently standard normally distributed. Using similar arguments
as in Example 4, we find that the FI again indicates weak fragility:
FI = lim
s→∞
lnP{βR + εx > s}
lnP{βR + εx > s, βR + εy > s} =
1 + 2β2
2 + 2β2
as t→∞.
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4.3. Continuous returns with heavy tails. Since there is no uniform termi-
nology in the literature, we will focus on the well known class of subexponential
distributions S and formulate the case τ > 0 as a special case. The class comprises
all the distributions in the domain of attraction of the extreme value distribution
with τ > 0 (Frechet limit law). The rest of the class S are distributions which
are in the maximum domain of attraction with τ = 0 (Gumbel limit law); but
it excludes distributions like the superexponentials. The case of subexponential
distributions in the domain of attraction of the Gumbel limit law when τ = 0, was
studied before by Willekens and Resnick [35].
The class S is defined by the property
(4.21) P (X1 +X2 > x) ∼ 2P (X1 > x) as x→∞,
where X1, X2 are i.i.d. random variables.
14 Since S is closed under asymptotic
equivalence of the tail of the d.f., the class is closed under addition of i.i.d. random
variables. The result (4.21) was obtained by Feller [12] for distributions with
regularly varying tails at infinity (when τ > 0).
The subclass of S for which τ > 0, are the distribution functions F which have
a first order term similar to the Pareto distribution, i.e.
(4.22) F (s) = 1− s−αL(s) as s→∞,
where L(s) is a slowly varying function such that
(4.23) lim
t→∞
L(ts)
L(t)
= 1, s > 0.
It is easy to see that conditions (4.22)-(4.23) are equivalent to
(4.24) lim
t→∞
F (ts)
F (t)
= s−α, α > 0, s > 0,
i.e., the tail of the distribution function F := 1− F varies regularly at infinity.15
14Alternatively subexponential distributions are characterized by the fact that the ratio of
probability of the sum and probability of the maximum exceeding a threshold from an i.i.d.
sample converges to one for large thresholds, implying that samples of subexponentials are
dominated by the largest observations.
15The tail index α can be interpreted as the number of bounded distributional moments.
And as not all moments are bounded, we speak of heavy tails. Distributions like the Student-t,
F-distribution, Burr distribution, sum-stable distributions with unbounded variance all fall into
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Apart from the distributions functions with a regularly varying tail, the class S
contains distributions like the lognormal and theWeibull distribution 1−exp{−xβ}
with parameter β < 1. The class S is of importance in ruin theory in insurance,
queueing theory and other areas of applied probability. For applications the reader
is referred to Asmussen [2], Embrechts et al. [10] or Rolski et al. [29].
For a portfolio Qn =
∑n
i=1 λiXi with positive portfolio weights λi and i.i.d.
subexponential Xi’s, it is well known that as s→∞
(4.25) P{
n∑
i=1
λiXi > s} ∼
n∑
i=1
P{λiXi > s}.
See e.g. Tang [32], or Geluk and de Vries [15]. We have the following result for
the fragility in this case.
Theorem 3. Suppose the random variables X, Xi (i = 1, . . . , n) are i.i.d. with
a subexponential distribution. Then for portfolios Qn =
∑n
i=1 λiXi and Wn =∑n
i=1 µiX we have
(4.26) κ = lim
s→∞E {κs|κs ≥ 1} = 1 + lims→∞
∑n
i=1 P{X > sλi ∨ sµi}∑n
i=1 P{X > sλi ∧ sµi}
.
Proof of Theorem 3. In order to prove (4.26), we need to prove the relations (4.27)
and (4.28) below in case x = y = 1.
It is well known (see Theorem 5 in [15]) that under the given conditions as
s→∞, for n = 2 and x, y > 0 fixed
(4.27) P{
n∑
i=1
λiXi > sx ∩
n∑
i=1
µiXi > sy} ∼
n∑
i=1
P{X > sx
λi
∨ sy
µi
}
and
(4.28) P{
n∑
i=1
λiXi > sx ∪
n∑
i=1
µiXi > sy} ∼
n∑
i=1
P{X > sx
λi
∧ sy
µi
}.
Since the proof of the second relation is similar, we only prove (4.27). The proof
is by induction. For n = 2, (4.27) follows from Theorem 5 in Geluk and de Vries
[15]. Note that linear combinations of i.i.d. subexponential random variables with
positive coefficients have a subexponential distribution function. This follows from
a combination of Theorems 1 and 2 in Embrechts and Goldie [9]. See also Corollary
1 in [15].
this class. It can be shown that the distribution of the stationary solution to ARCH and GARCH
processes also belongs to this class, see De Haan et al. [17] for a proof.
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Next we show that the result holds with n + 1 instead of n. Since x, y > 0
are arbitrary, we may assume that the additional term satisfies λn+1 = µn+1 = 1.
It follows from (4.27) that Qn ∧Wn has a subexponential distribution function.
Application of Theorem 1 in [9] then gives
P{Qn +X > s,Wn +X > s} = P{(Qn ∧Wn) +X > s} ∼
P{(Qn ∧Wn) > s}+ P{X > s} ∼
n+1∑
i=1
P{X > s
λi
∨ s
µi
},
where the last equivalence follows from the induction hypothesis. This completes
the induction step. ¤
We present several examples to illustrate the use of Theorem 3 in the (heavy
tailed) cases τ > 0 and τ = 0.
4.3.1. Frechet domain of attraction τ > 0. The subexponential distributions in
the Frechet domain of attraction are regularly varying as defined in (4.24). For
this class and two risk factors (4.26) specializes to (4.29) below.
Example 6. In case two portfolios have the structure Q2 = λ1X1 + λ2X2 and
W2 = µ1X1+µ2X2 where X1 and X2 are i.i.d. with a regularly varying distribution
function tail with tail index α, using (4.26) and the regular variation of the d.f.
tail it follows that
(4.29) FI = 1 +
(λ1 ∧ µ1)α + (λ2 ∧ µ2)α
(λ1 ∨ µ1)α + (λ2 ∨ µ2)α
The zero beta example for the regularly varying distributed returns as given in de
Vries [33] is a special case. Thus for the portfolios (2.1) and (2.2), (4.29) implies
that
(4.30) κ = 1 + (
1
γ
− 1)±α, as γ > (<)1
2
.
So the system is strongly fragile.
Remark 3. It pays for intuition to demonstrate this result in a more direct way.
The Feller [12] additivity result (4.21) implies that P{Q > s} ∼ [γα + (1 −
γ)α]s−αL(s) for large s. What transpires is that the probability to be above the
portfolio line is, to a first order, dictated by the marginal probabilities P{γY > s}
and P{(1− γ)X > s}. The rest of the area does not contribute significantly (has
WEAK & STRONG FINANCIAL FRAGILITY 29
mass of lower order). Similarly, the joint probability 1− P{Q ≤ s,W ≤ s} is de-
termined by the amount of the probability mass along the X and Y axes, starting
from where the failures area cuts the X and Y axes closest to the origin, i.e. at
(s/γ, 0) and (0, s/γ). Thus 1 − P{Q ≤ s,W ≤ s} ∼ 2γαs−αL(s) for large s. A
direct proof of this result based on regular variation rather than subexponentiality,
is provided in the Appendix for the benefit of the reader. Taking ratios then gives
(4.30).
Example 7. Consider the equal beta asset returns X and Y from (2.3) and (2.4)
respectively, with βx = βy = β. Suppose the market factor R, idiosyncratic risk
εx and εy are i.i.d. with regularly varying tail and tail index α. Application of
Theorem 3 shows that the system is strongly fragile and the fragility measure reads
(4.31) FI = κ = 1 +
βα
βα + 2
.
For the subexponential distributions in the Frechet domain of attraction, i.e.
which are regularly varying as defined in (4.24), (4.26) specializes to (4.29), and
hence the asymptotic dependency is generic. But for the subexponential distribu-
tions with a rapidly varying distribution tail, i.e. those which are in the Gumbel
domain of attraction, the results are more subtle as the examples in the next
subsection show.
4.3.2. Gumbel domain of attraction τ = 0. For the subexponential distributions
in the domain of the Gumbel distribution it depends on the specifics of the case
whether the system exhibits asymptotic dependence or independence.
Example 8. Consider the zero beta portfolios (2.1) and (2.2). Suppose that the
returns X and Y are subexponentially distributed and are in the maximum domain
of attraction of the Gumbel distribution. From Theorem 3 and the rapid variation
of 1−F , it follows that κ = 1 (assume γ 6= 1/2). To compute the FI index, assume
in particular that the returns follow a subexponential Weibull type distribution
F (x) = 1− exp{−xξ}, x > 0 with 0 < ξ < 1.
Using (4.27), we find weak fragility
FI = lim
s→∞
1
2
lnP{Q > s}+ lnP{W > s}
lnP{Q > s,W > s} =
(
1− γ
γ
)ξ
.
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Example 9. Consider again the equal beta asset returns X and Y , with βx =
βy = β. Suppose the market factor R, idiosyncratic risks εx and εy are i.i.d.
with a subexponential distribution in the Gumbel domain of attraction and support
on R+; for example a lognormal distribution. The example is used to build some
intuition for the Theorem 3 result in the Gumbel domain of attraction case. To
do this, we make use of the rule (4.25) and the following result
(4.32) lim
s→∞
P{R > ts}
P{R > s} =
 0 if t > 1∞ if 0 < t < 1 ,
which stems from the rapid variation of the upper tail, see Embrechts et al. [10].
The first result is (i = x, y)
(4.33) P{βR + εi > s} ∼

P{βR > s} if β > 1
2P{R > s} if β = 1
P{R > s} if β < 1
.
To show this, note that by (4.25)
P{βR + εx > s} = P{βR + εy > s} ∼ P{βR > s}+ P{R > s}.
Dividing by P{βR > s} in case β > 1, and by P{R > s} in case β < 1, taking
limits and using (4.32) yields the asymptotic equivalences (4.33).
To evaluate the joint failure probability, we resort to using bounds. Note that
an upper bound for the joint failure probability is
P{βR + εx > s, βR + εy > s} ≤ P{2βR + εx + εy > 2s}.
By (4.25) this bound is asymptotic to
(4.34) P{βR + 1
2
εx +
1
2
εy > s} ∼ P{βR > s}+ 2P{1
2
R > s}
for large s. For β < 1, by the rule (4.32)
lim
s→∞
P{βR > s}/P{R > s}+ 2P{1
2
R > s}/P{R > s}
2P{βR > s}/P{R > s}+ 2 = 0.
Thus for β < 1
κ ≤ lim
s→∞
1
1− P{2βR+εx+εy>2s}
P{βR+εx>s}+P{βR+εy>s}
= 1.
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The two assets are therefore asymptotically independent.
For β = 1, combine the upper bound (4.34) with the lower bound (recall the random
variables are non-negative)
(4.35) P{βR + εx > s, βR + εy > s} ≥ P{βR > s},
to sandwich κ
4
3
= lim
s→∞
1
1− P{R>s}
P{R+εx>s}+P{R+εy>s}
≤ κ ≤ lim
s→∞
1
1−1+2P{ 12R>s}/P{R>s}
2+2
=
4
3
.
Hence FI = 4/3, meaning that the two assets are asymptotically dependent.
Lastly, we investigate the case β > 1. Using the upper bound again and dividing
by P{βR > s} gives
κ ≥ lim
s→∞
1
1− 1
2+2P{R>s}/P{βR>s}
= 2.
Thus if β > 1 the dependency is maximal (in the tail area).
One can also verify these results directly by application of Theorem 3 with λ1 =
µ1 = β, λ2 = 1, µ2 = 0, λ3 = 0, and µ3 = 1. This shows that
κ = 1 + lim
s→∞
P{R > s/β}
P{R > s/β}+ 2P{R > s} .
Then use (4.32) to find the κ value.
Remark 4. Note the stark contrast between this last example and the example
7 for the subclass of regular varying distributions. In the example 7 the linkage
measure changes continuously with the value of β, cf. (4.31). At β = {0, 1,∞} the
κ values for the two cases coincide, but at intermediate values the subexponential
distributions in the maximum domain of attraction of the Gumbel either imply
maximal asymptotic dependence or asymptotic independence. Also note that for
both cases the correlation coefficient is β2/(1+β2) and hence changes continuously
with β as well.
4.4. Summary. We summarize these results by returning to the question of sys-
temic risk. As noted before, in the banking industry the risks of an individual
bank are captured by the VaR measure. The systemic risk is that there may occur
multiple failures. Let the critical VaR failure level be denoted by s. For the zero
beta portfolio example, the probability of an individual failure reads
P{Q > s} = P{W > s} = q,
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Table 1. Individual and Systemic Failure Probabilities
q ∼ P{Q > s,W > s} ∼ limit
Uniform
1
2
1
γ(1−γ) (1− s)2 ³ 1γ (1− s)2 s→ 1−
Pareto, α > 1
[(1− γ)α + γα] s−α ³ 2 (1− γ)α s−α s→∞
Unit exponential
γ
2γ−1 exp
(
− s
γ
)
À 1
2γ−1 exp (−2s) s→∞
say. Thus q is the inverse of the VaR measure s. Focussing on the probability q
rather than the VaR level is useful for comparison with the systemic risk. The
probability of a systemic breakdown is P{Q > s,W > s}. On the basis of the
above, we have collected the following results in the Table 1.16
For γ ∈ (1/2, 1) the systemic risk in case of the exponential distribution is
of lower order than the univariate VaR risk. But for the Pareto and uniform
distribution the systemic risk is of the same order as the univariate VaR risk. In
fact, we have the following summary result.
Proposition 1. Suppose that the FSI’ asset and liability risks are affine combi-
nations of independent risk drivers. The Basel II and Solvency II per individual
FSI based VaR criterion is to a first order also the appropriate criterion for safe-
guarding against systemic risk in case the marginal distributions of the risk drivers
are from the class of the superexponential distributions since the systemic risk is
relatively unimportant.17 If the risk drivers are in the domain of attraction of the
Frechet or Weibull limit distribution, however, the systemic risk is of the same
order as the marginal VaR risk.18 From a system’s perspective the per individual
FSI based VaR criterion is then overly conservative.
16Only the dominant first order terms are represented, f ³ g, means that f/g is bounded
away from 0 and ∞, f À g means f/g →∞.
17The subexponential distributions in the maximum domain of the Gumbel require a case by
case treatment as the examples showed.
18For the Weibull case, all bank portfolios must have an exposure to the same risk drivers
for this result to hold. Otherwise the orders of magnitude differ and systemic risk is relatively
unimportant.
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For two reasons it is important to have a scale like the FI as a measure of
the potential for simultaneous failures. First, like the individual FSI based VaR
measure, however imperfect, it is necessary to have a measure to be able to discuss
and compare the stability of different financial networks. Measurement predates
eventual regulatory and supervisory action. Second, we argued before that the
individual FSI based approach can be overly conservative as it counts the joint
failure as often as the number of FSI in the system. In a non-normal world, the
systemic risk can be of the same order as the univariate VaR risk.
5. ECONOMICS
We return to the economic issues outlined before and discuss implications of the
probability results. We derive economically relevant limit copulas, we investigate
different banking networks and their FI scale, we briefly deal with non-linear
instruments and discuss sunspot equilibria.
5.1. Copulas. Copulas have gained in popularity as a measure of dependency in
economics and finance due to the dismay over the standard use of correlation.
For this reason it appears important to connect the concept of a copula to our
measure. Recall that the FI only has something to say about the tail region, while
a copula is a global dependency measure. By taking limits, the two concepts can
be connected
(5.1) κ = lim
s→∞E {κs|κs ≥ 1} = limp↑1
2(1− p)
1− C(p, p) ,
where C(., .) is the bivariate copula. The Morgenstern copula for example,
C(x, y; δ) = xy[1 + δ(1− x)(1− y)], − 1 ≤ δ ≤ 1,
implies asymptotic independence as κ = 1. whereas The logistic copula,
C(x, y; β) = exp[−{(− lnx)1/β + (− ln y)1/β}β], 0 < β ≤ 1,
induces asymptotic dependence with κ = 21−β ≥ 1. Longin and Solnik [25] used
the logistic copula to estimate the dependency between equity markets. There
exist, however, many other copulas and the question is which copula should be
chosen for the analysis of systemic stability.
Let us come back to the example portfolios and derive an economic motivated
property of the copula. Recall the zero beta portfolios (2.1) and (2.2). Let X and
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Y be i.i.d. random variables with (identical) regularly varying tails as in (4.22).
Suppose γ ∈ (1/2, 1) and let limt,s→∞ t/s = c > 0, some positive constant. For
the joint distribution function P{Q ≤ s,W ≤ t}, one has
P{Q ≤ s,W ≤ t} =

1− [γα+(1− γ)α]c−αs−αL(s) as 1
c
> γ
1−γ
1− γα[1 + c−α]s−αL(s) as 1−γ
γ
≤1
c
≤ γ
1−γ
1− [γα+(1− γ)α]s−αL(s) as 1
c
<1−γ
γ
as s, t→∞. Recall the Remark 3, where we argued that for c = 1, P{Q ≤ s,W ≤
s} ∼ 1− 2γαs−αL(s).
Alternatively, we verify the limit on the right hand side in (5.1). The limit
copula associated with P{Q ≤ s,W ≤ t} reads
CQ,W (x, y) =

y as 1−y
1−x > (
γ
1−γ )
α
1− γα
γα+(1−γ)α [2− x− y] as (1−γγ )α ≤ 1−y1−x ≤ ( γ1−γ )α
x as 1−y
1−x < (
1−γ
γ
)α
for x and y in a neighborhood of 1.19 Note that if α is close to zero, CQ,W (x, y) is
close to the maximal dependent copula min(x, y). While if α is large, CQ,W (x, y)
is close to x+ y− 1, which for x, y in a neighborhood of 1 is the first order Taylor
approximation to the independent copula.20 It readily follows that21
lim
p↑1
2(1− p)
1− C(p, p)= limp↑1
2(1− p)
1− [1− γα
γα+(1−γ)α2(1− p)]
= 1 + (
1
γ
−1)α.
Note how the limit copula differs from the standard type of copulas. The upshot
of all this is that economically relevant copulas may be quite different from the
popular functional forms from the literature. The choice of copulas in applied
work is partly driven by the ease to which these lend themselves to estimation.
But this may not always yield the economically relevant specification. For the
economic problem of systemic risk in the financial sector, we now at least have a
19A similar result holds for the case of the distributions in the domain of attraction of the
Weibull, i.e. when τ < 0. This is particularly easy to see for the Example 2 of uniform
distributions.
20These are the Frechet Hoeffding bounds.
21Note that for the case of the uniform distributions discussed in the example 2, one finds
C(p, p) = 1− 2γ(1− p).
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theory about the relevant economic (limiting) functional form of the copula in the
failure region.22
5.2. options. Consider how the analysis has to be adapted when the portfolio
includes non-linear instruments like an option. Note this does not necessarily
destroy the linearity of a portfolio, as this is still linear in the option’s return.
Suppose, however, that one portfolio consists in a call option which is held till
maturity and that another portfolio comprises the underlying. Then one has to
take care of the nonlinearities due to the fact that the option may be out of the
money. Let St denote the share price at time t and let Ct denote the price of the
(European) call option. Suppose the call is at the money at the time of purchase
t. The option expires at time T > t. If held till maturity, the gross returns on the
underlying and the call are respectively
ST
St
and max[0, (
ST
St
− 1)St
Ct
],
where St/Ct > 1. Suppose that ST/St follows a (continuous) distribution F (ST/St)
say, for which the left tail is in the domain of attraction of the Weibull distribution,
and
lim
s↓0
P{ST
St
≤ s} = 0,
while F (1) > 0. So there is a non-zero probability that the option ends out of the
money. It follows that
lim
s↓0
P{max[0, (ST
St
− 1)St
Ct
] ≤ s} = F (1).
Note moreover that the joint probability for s < 1 collapses to
lim
s↓0
P{ST
St
≤ s,max[0, (ST
St
− 1)St
Ct
] ≤ s} = P{ST
St
≤ s}.
Since if ST < St, the option return is zero and the hence
max[0, (
ST
St
− 1)St
Ct
] ≤ s < 1
is automatically satisfied. It follows that FI = 1/2, i.e. the two portfolios are
asymptotically independent.
22In case there are more than two assets, the middle line segment in the limit copula is cut up
into multiple straight line segments with different slopes, where the kinks are driven by where
the portfolio hyperplanes cut the portfolio axes.
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To give one other example, consider two portfolios each consisting of an at the
money call option, where each option is written on a different stock. Suppose the
two stock returns are independently distributed, with distribution functions F (.)
and G(.). Thus the loss returns on the two stocks are evidently asymptotically
independent. Assume again that the two stock returns have continuous distribu-
tions and that the there is a non-zero probability that the stock prices fall below
their level at the date of purchase of the option, i.e. F (1) > 0, and G(1) > 0.23 It
follows that for the two option portfolios
lim
s↓0
E {κs|κs ≥ 1} = 1
1− F (1)G(1)
F (1)+G(1)
> 1,
since F (1)G(1) > 0. Thus the option portfolios are asymptotically dependent even
though the stock portfolios are asymptotically independent! While these cases may
appear contrived, they are actually quite relevant given the huge exposures of the
banking book to derivatives.
5.3. sequence of FSI networks and large portfolios. In this section we in-
vestigate how different dependence measures and different tail shapes affect the
ranking of different FSI networks regarding their systemic risk. The network
configurations we discuss are motivated by the cases discussed in the banking lit-
erature on systemic risk, such as Rochet and Tirole [28], Allen and Gale [1] and
Freixas, Parigi and Rochet [13].
Suppose there are four projects with returns: 4U , 4X, 4Y , and 4T . The returns
to the projects U , X, Y , and T are random and are independently distributed.
We investigate and compare the cases where these random variables either follow
a standard normal distribution or have a Student-t distribution with α degrees of
freedom. The projects can be broken down into four equally sized participations.
There are also four distinct banks with returns: B1, B2, B3, and B4. Consider the
following cases of syndicated loans.
Case 1. Each bank finances one entire project. In particular the returns are
B1 = 4U, B2 = 4X, B3 = 4Y, B4 = 4T,
where we identify the portfolio return of each bank with its name tag Bi.
23The options have the same expiration date and are bought on the same date.
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Case 2. Each bank participates in two projects. The specific portfolios are
B1 = 2U + 2X,B2 = 2X + 2Y, B3 = 2Y + 2T, B4 = 2T + 2U.
Case 3. There is further diversification. In particular, the portfolios are
B1 = 2U +X + Y,B2 = 2X + Y + T, B3 = 2Y + T + U, B4 = 2T + U +X.
Case 4. All bank portfolios are fully diversified:
Bi = U +X + Y + T, for i = 1, ..., 4.
Note that these syndicates represent different network configurations as dis-
cussed in Allen and Gale [1] and Freixas, Parigi and Rochet [13], but in this case
for loan syndication rather than for the interbank market. In particular the last
portfolio is reminiscent to the diversified lending case and the second portfolio
resembles the credit chain funding of Freixas et al. [13].
5.3.1. normally distributed returns. Suppose the project returns U , X, Y , and
T are independent and follow a standard normal distribution. For these cases
we evaluate the FI (3.12). With normally distributed returns, the returns are
asymptotically independent except for the fully diversified syndicates and we have
to use the second part of the FI scale. To evaluate the numerator we use Laplace’s
asymptotic expansion, for large s
P{Bi > s} ∼ 1√
2pi
σ
s
exp(− s
2
2σ2
),
where the variance σ2 is 16, 8, 6 and 4 for the cases 1 to 4 respectively.
For the denominator we need the multivariate analogue of this approxima-
tion which is available from Ruben [31]. Suppose (B1, B2, B3, B4) has a (non-
degenerate) multivariate normal distribution with mean zero and covariance ma-
trix V . Let M = V −1 be the inverse of the covariance matrix and write its
determinant as |M |. Denote the vector (1, ..., 1) by ι and write
(δ1, δ2, δ3, δ4) = ιM.
Then it follows from Ruben [31] that for s large
P{B1 > s,B2 > s,B3 > s,B4 > s} '(5.2)
(2pi)−4/2
√
|M |
s4δ1δ2δ3δ4
exp
(
−1
2
s2ιMιT
)
.
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Since the terms in the exponent dominate, it follows that
(5.3)
1
4
lim
s→∞
∑4
i=1 logP{Bi > s}
logP{B1 > s,B2 > s,B3 > s,B4 > s} =
1
σ2
1
ιMιT
.
Thus for normal distribution in combination with the FI the covariance matrix
V is a natural representation of the network dependencies, even far into the tails.
Turning now to the specific cases, in case one the V = 16I, where I is the
identity matrix. Hence ιMιT = 4/16, and from (5.3) it follows that FI = 1/4.
The second case is somewhat non-standard and we cannot immediately apply
(5.3). Note that banks are only partially connected, which is reflected through the
zero’s in the covariance matrix
V =

8 4 0 4
4 8 4 0
0 4 8 4
4 0 4 8

.
But knowing the returns for the first three bank portfolios implies the fourth
B4 = B1 +B3 −B2.
Thus it follows that |M | = 0 and the correlation matrix is singular. Thus we
cannot directly apply Ruben’s result. One can write, however,
P{B1 > s,B2 > s,B3 > s,B4 > s} =
P{B1 > s,B2 > s,B3 > s,B1 +B3 −B2 > s}
and use Ruben’s [31] result in the three dimensional space with the restriction
B1 +B3 −B2 > s. We have from Ruben that
(5.4) P{B1 > s,B2 > s,B3 > s} ∼ (2pi)−3/2
√
|M |
s3δ1δ2δ3
exp
(
−1
2
s2ιMιT
)
and where M is the covariance matrix of {B1, B2, B3}. The linear restriction
B1 + B3 − B2 > s only affects the constants δ1δ2δ3 in (5.4). Hence, the FI
measure is
1
4
lim
s→∞
∑4
i=1 logP{Bi > s}
logP{B1 > s,B2 > s,B3 > s} =
1
8
1
1/4
=
1
2
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For case three the covariance matrix has full rank and reads
V =

6 3 4 3
3 6 3 4
4 3 6 3
3 4 3 6

.
One computes that ιMιT = 1/4, so that FI = 4/6.
The fully diversified portfolios imply that all banks become perfectly corre-
lated, so that we are in a case of maximal asymptotic dependence and FI =
lims→∞E {κs|κs ≥ 1} = 4. The measure nicely reflects the increases in network
connectedness as we move from first case to the last case.
5.3.2. fat tails. Now suppose the project returns are rescaled Student-t distributed,
so that the projects still have the same first two moments as under normality but
exhibit heavy tails. This implies that for large s
Pr{U > s} = Pr{X > s} = Pr{Y > s} = Pr{T > s}
∼ as−α (a, α > 0, s→∞),
where α is the number of degrees of freedom. In this case (3.4) is a natural measure
for the extreme network dependencies. It is immediate that for case 1 we have
FI = κ = 1.
For case 2, using Feller’s convolution theorem [12] as s→∞
Pr{2U + 2X > s} ∼ 2a2αs−α.
Moreover by the arguments above, the probability of no failures
Pr{2U + 2X ≤ s, 2X + 2Y ≤ s, 2Y + 2T ≤ s, 2T + 2U ≤ s, }
can be found by noting that the set
(2U + 2X = s, 2X + 2Y = s, 2Y + 2T = s, 2T + 2U = s)
cuts the four axes at the points
(
s
2
, 0, 0, 0); (0,
s
2
, 0, 0); (0, 0,
s
2
, 0); (0, 0, 0,
s
2
).
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Above each of the these points there is (approximate) mass a2αs−α along the axes.
The mass above the four points together gives the probability
1− Pr{2U + 2X ≤ s, 2X + 2Y ≤ s, 2Y + 2T ≤ s, 2T + 2U ≤ s, }
∼ 4× a2αs−α.
Combining gives
FI = κ =
4× 2a2αs−α
4× a2αs−α = 2.
The third case is interesting since the denominator is as in the second case.
Note that the set
(2U +X + Y = s, 2X + Y + T = s, 2Y + T + U = s, 2T + U +X = s)
cuts the axes at the points
(
s
2
, 0, 0, 0); (0,
s
2
, 0, 0); (0, 0,
s
2
, 0); (0, 0, 0,
s
2
)
as in the previous case. Since we need the probability to be below planes like
2U +X + Y = s,
the binding point is where this plane cuts the axes closest to the origin, i.e. along
the U−axis where the triangle cuts at s/2. Thus
1− Pr{2U +X + Y ≤ s, 2X + Y + T ≤ s,
2Y + T + U ≤ s, 2T + U +X ≤ s, }
= 4× a2αs−α.
The numerator is straightforward by Feller’s convolution result and equals
4× Pr{2U +X + Y > s} ∼ 4(2α + 2)as−α.
Hence, the third network implies
FI = κ =
4(2α + 2)as−α
4a2αs−α
= 1 +
1
2α−1
.
Note that for α > 1, this network is less fragile than the previous one.
Lastly, with full diversification, the four portfolios become totally dependent so
that FI = κ = 4.
We compare the sequence of networks by their ranking of systemic dependencies,
see the Table 2. If we were to use the correlation matrices, we would conclude that
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Table 2. Fragility Index and Bank Portfolios
Portfolio B1 FI Index
Normal Student-t
4U 1/4 1
2U+2X 1/2 2
2U+X+Y 2/3 1 + 1
2α−1
U+X+Y+T 4 4
the networks become increasingly more interdependent and exposed to systemic
risk. A different picture emerges if we use the FI scale. Indeed, for networks 1,
2 and 4, the measure κ is also increasing under the Student-t assumption. But
the third network has a lower asymptotic dependency measure than the second
network as long as the first moment is bounded, i.e. α > 1. Thus the monotonicity
is upset under fat tails. The intuition for this non-monotonicity is as follows. Both
under normality and in case of the Student-t assumption, the univariate failure
probabilities decrease as we move from case 2 to case 3. This is the benefit of
diversification. In case of the normal, this reduction does not lower the joint
failure probability24, so that the mass is moved in the direction where there are
no failures and the multidimensional disc representing normal iso probability sets
becomes more pointed, i.e. the dependence increases in the center. In case of the
fat tailed distributions though, when moving from case 2 to 3, the joint failure
probability is reduced even though the probability on at least one failure remains
constant. This causes the drop in the FI index.
5.4. sunspots. The theoretical economics literature also devotes a considerable
attention to the issue of multiple equilibria and how agents coordinate on these
equilibria. With multiple equilibria fundamentals do not fully determine outcomes,
somehow one of the equilibria is being played by coordination on a sunspot. We
now show that this approach can also be subsumed under our reduced form ap-
proach.
Consider the Diamond and Dybvig liquidity preference model of banking. In
this model there are two Nash equilibria, one with and the other without a bank
24In fact P{B1 > s,B2 > s,B3 > s} is the same for all four cases under normality.
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run. Assume that agents can coordinate on one of the equilibria via the exogenous
device of a sunspot. The sunspot is a random variable that has no direct effect
on the economy. Suppose there is a Bernoulli random variable representing the
sunspot that indicates which of the two equilibria is relevant. More specifically,
take three independently distributed asset returns X, Y and Z. Let the portfolio
returns be Q = X + Y with probability pi, and Q = Y with probability 1 − pi.
Similarly, let W = X + Z with probability pi, and W = Z with probability 1− pi.
Note that with probability 1− pi the portfolio returns are independent. All three
assets X, Y and Z are i.i.d. distributed with Pareto type tails
P{X > s} = P{Y > s} = P{Z > s} = cs−α, c > 0, s²[c1/α,∞).
Application of Theorem 3 then gives
κ = lim
s→∞
P{Q > s}+ P{W > s}
1− P{Q ≤ s,W ≤ s}
= 1 +
pi
2 + pi
.
In case the random variables are normally distributed one also checks that the
fragility index reduces to FI = 3/4, since the correlation is 1/2 in case of the pi
state, while the other state does not count.
6. Conclusion
FSI systems are well known to be inherently unstable. Thus there is need for
a measure of the potential for systemic breakdown. It is well understood that
the correlation measure may not accurately reflect the risk of joint breakdowns.
To remedy this deficiency we have constructed a scale FI which accurately mea-
sures the severity of joint tail risk in higher dimensions. The FI scale reveals the
type of tail dependence (asymptotic dependence or independence), which either
implies strong or weak fragility of the system, and also indicates the amount of
such dependence. FSI portfolios are essentially linear in their exposures, either
directly through the portfolio asset and liability returns or indirectly through the
relation with macro risk factors. This permits an evaluation of the FI under a
very wide range of asset return distributions. Assuming that the marginal dis-
tributions of the risk drivers are in the domain of attraction of an (univariate)
extreme value limit law, we showed when the system would be weakly and when
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it is strongly fragile. For example, discrete returns and with all types of assets
present in all bank portfolios imply strong fragility. Under continuous discounting,
normal distributed returns induce weak fragility, but Student-t type returns ren-
der the system strongly fragile. Subsequently we studied different kind of banking
networks and their fragility in terms of FI and used the arguments to construct
the characteristics of economically relevant copula. It is hoped that this charac-
terization of the financial fragility will help in bridging the gap between theory
and practice and be especially helpful in evaluating the systemic aspects of FSI
supervision.
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7. Appendix
Since the proof for the general case of subexponentials comprising the Gumbel
part is quite involved, we provide a simple proof for the Frechet subcase τ > 0 to
enhance the reader’s intuition. By the domain of attraction assumption
(7.1) lim
n→∞nP {X1 > xa(n)} = x
−α for x > 0, i = 1, 2,
where a is again the inverse function of the distribution function of Xi at the point
1− 1/x. Hence, for x, y > 0 and independence
lim
n→∞nP {X1 > xa(n) or X2 > ya(n)} =
lim
n→∞nP{X1 > xa(n)}+ limn→∞nP{X2 > ya(n)}
− lim
n→∞nP{X1 > xa(n)}P{X2 > ya(n)} =
x−α + y−α + 0.(7.2)
From (7.1) and (7.2) we get for x, y > 0 as n→∞
nP{X1 ≤ xa(n) and X2 > ya(n)} =
nP{X1 > xa(n) or X2 > ya(n)} − nP{X1 > xa(n)} → y−α.
By subtracting two similar expressions this gives for 0 < x1 < x2 and y > 0
(7.3) nP{x1a(n) ≤ X1 < x2a(n) and X2 > ya(n)} → 0.
Also by (7.1) and (7.2)
(7.4) lim
n→∞nP{X1 > xa(n) and X2 > ya(n)} = 0.
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Next, consider the joint tails of the portfolios. We need to evaluate asymptotically
(7.5) nP{λ1Y1 + λ2Y1 > xa(n) or µ1Y1 + µ2Y2 > ya(n)}.
Look at the problem from a geometric point of view. Consider the area
S := {(s, t) ∈ R+ × R+ | λ1s+ λ2t > x or µ1s+ µ2t > y}.
For simplicity let µ2x < λ2y and µ1x > λ1y. Now
S ⊃ {(s, t) | s > y
µ1
or t >
x
λ2
}.
Hence by (7.2) the limit (7.5) is at least
(
x
λ2
)−α
+
(
y
µ1
)−α
.
Also
S ⊂ {(s, t) | s > ε x
λ1
and t > ε
y
µ1
} ∪
[
0, ε
x
λ1
]
×
[
(1− ε) x
λ2
,∞
)
∪
∪
[
0, ε
y
µ1
]
×
[
(1− ε) x
µ2
,∞
)
,
and thus by (7.3) and (7.4) the limit (7.5) is at most
(
(1− ε) x
λ2
)−α
+
(
(1− ε) y
µ1
)−α
.
It follows that in the limit (7.5) is
(
x
λ2
)−α
+
(
y
µ1
)−α
.
So far we have considered the case µ2x < λ2y and µ1x > λ1y. Checking the other
cases yields that
lim
n→∞nP {λ1Y1 + λ2Y2 > xa(n) or µ1Y1 + µ2Y2 > ya(n)}
=
(
x
λ1
∧ y
µ1
)−α
+
(
x
λ2
∧ y
µ2
)−α
.
It follows that the vector (X1, X2) is in de domain of attraction of an extreme value
distribution with marginal extreme value index τ = 1/α and discrete spectral
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measure concentrated on two points in the interior of its range. In particular, we
have the denominator for (4.29).
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